

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 01 OF 12 281825Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15
TRSE-00 NRC-05 /083 W
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INFO USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW YRORITY
ERUDORRA/USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM NATO MBFR
SUBJ: MBFR: INFORMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF
JUNE 27, 1978

1. BEGIN SUMMAIY: IN THE JUNE 27, 1978 INFORMAL SESSION OF THE
VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THE ACTING CANADIAN
REP, FRG REP AND US DEP REP, AND THE EAST BY SOVIET REPS TARASOV
AND SHUSTOV, POLISH REP STRULAK AND CZECHOSLOVAK REP
KEBLUSEK. MILITARY ADVISORS WERE ALSO PRESENT.

2. BOTH SIDES COMMENTED ON THE EAST'S JUNE 8 PROPOSALS AS THEY
CONCERNED THE OPERATION OF THE COLLECTIVE CEILING. THE EAST
SUGGESTED THE POSSIBILITY, IN THE EVENT THAT THE WEST WAS UNABLE
TO MAINTAIN ITS COMMON CEILING TOTAL FOLLOWING UNILATERAL
REDUCTIONS BY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, THAT THERE MIGHT BE A
SPECIAL EAST/WEST AGREEMENT ON THIS TOPIC. THE EAST ANSWERED
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 01 OF 12 281825Z

WESTERN QUESTIONS FROM THE LAST SESSION ON THE EASTERN JUNE 8
PROPOSALS AND ON EASTERN DATA. THE WEST ASKED MORE QUESTIONS ON
THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSAL AND PRESENTED A PAPER ANSWERING
EASTERN QUESTIONS ON WESTERN DATA AND ASKING FURTHER QUESTIONS
ON EASTERN DATA.

3. POLISH REP SAID THE CONSENT OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO

ESTABLISH COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS HAD CREATED A PRACTICAL BASIS FOR ACHIEVING MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON ONE OF THE KEY ISSUES IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS AS REGARDS THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON CEILING COULD PERMIT SOME WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO EXCEED THEIR PRE-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS. A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT WHICH IN SUBSTANCE PERMITTED ANY STATE TO AVOID REDUCTIONS IN THIS WAY HAD NO VALUE WHATSOEVER. CONSEQUENTLY, IN ITS OWN PROPOSAL ON COLLECTIVITY, THE EAST HAD INTRODUCED CONDITIONS WHICH WOULD PREVENT THIS. THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO LIMIT SUBSTITUTION OF CIVILIANS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS WAS INTENDED AS A FURTHER CONDITION TO AVOID THE POSSIBLE EVASION OF AN AGREEMENT. IF THE NATO OR WARSAW TREATY STATES WERE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THEIR FORCES AT THE ENVISAGED LEVEL, THIS WOULD CREATE A COMPLETELY NEW CIRCUMSTANCE WHICH SHOULD BE ADDITIONALLY CONSIDERED BY THE PARTICIPANTS WITH A VIEW OF MAINTAINING THE AGREED COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS. POLISH REP REJECTED SEPARATE LIMITATIONS ON SOVIET FORCES. HE SAID THE EAST COULD NOT ACCEPT A SYSTEM WHICH WOULD ESTABLISH COLLECTIVE CEILINGS FOR SOME PARTICIPANTS AND INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS FOR OTHER PARTICIPANTS. EQUAL TREATMENT FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS WAS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE EAST'S ACCEPTANCE OF COLLECTIVITY.

4. FRG REP SAID WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WELCOMED THE EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT MANPOWER CEILINGS TO BE APPLIED TO THE OVERALL GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE. THIS WAS A POTENTIAL FORWARD
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 01 OF 12 281825Z

STEP IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, THE PARTICULAR METHOD WHICH THE EAST HAD CHOSEN TO CARRY OUT THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY APPEARED TO CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS. THE EAST'S JUNE 8 PROPOSALS COULD RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE THE WEST WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ITS PERMITTED MAXIMUM LEVEL, BUT WHERE SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR PRE-REDUCTION STRENGTH WHILE THE LARGE SOVIET FORCES IN THE ADJACENT AREA, FORCES WHICH WOULD BE UNDER NO LIMITATION AS TO SIZE, MIGHT EVEN INCREASE STILL FURTHER. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS, ON THE OTHER HAND, WOULD AFFORD EACH SIDE THE PRACTICAL OPPORTUNITY TO MAINTAIN ITS AGREED PRE-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, WHILE PREVENTING AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION IN WHICH THE USSR COULD AFTER REDUCTIONS INCREASE ITS FORCES NOT ONLY ON ITS ADJACENT TERRITORY BUT IN THE REDUCTIONS AREA AS WELL. WESTERN REPS WELCOMED THE EASTERN MOVES OF PRINCIPLE ON THE TOPIC OF THE MANPOWER CEILING BUT THOUGHT THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS REMAINED A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE.

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 02 OF 12 281844Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

5. US DEP REP SAID THE SOLUTION PROPOSED BY POLISH REP FOR PROBLEM CAUSED IF WEST COULD NOT RETURN UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO ITS PERMITTED MAXIMUM STRENGTH WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON THE UNILATERAL DISCRETION OF THE EAST. MOREOVER, THE IMPLICATION THAT THE EAST MIGHT AGREE TO COME DOWN TO THE NEW WESTERN LEVEL WOULD NOT DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS CAUSED FOR NATO BY THE FACT THAT ACTIVE DUTY SOVIET FORCES IN THE ADJOINING SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN SIZE AND MIGHT EVEN INCREASE. FOR THESE REASONS, NATO MUST BE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN ITS FORCES AT THE AGREED MAXIMUM LEVEL FOLLOWING REDUCTIONS.

6. FRG REP SAID THE WEST COULD NOT PLACE ITSELF IN A POSITION WHERE IT WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON EASTERN COOPERATION. EVEN IN THE HIGHLY HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION THAT THE FRG WOULD INCREASE ITS FORCES, THE EAST WOULD HAVE THE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCE OF THE LARGE SOVIET FORCES IN THE ADJACENT TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 02 OF 12 281844Z

7. TARASOV IN INPROMPTU REMARKS SAID BOTH THE WESTERN AND EASTERN PROPOSALS ON THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING HAD BEEN CONSTRUCTED IN THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE QUESTION OF THE

EXISTENCE OF THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION. SUCH PROPOSALS COULD NOT IN ANY EVENT CHANGE THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY. IT WAS WHOLLY IMPROBABLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD RESTORE ITS PRE-REDUCTION LEVELS. (COMMENT: TARASOV DID NOT DENY THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS WOULD MAKE THIS POSSIBLE) THE WEST WAS USING THIS IMPROBABLE SITUATION AS A PRETEXT FOR FURTHERING THE SCHEME OF TRANSFERRING NATO FORCES FROM THE FORCES OF ONE NATO PARTICIPANT TO THOSE OF ANOTHER. WHY SHOULD THE WEST BE CONCERNED BY THE COMPOSITION OF EASTERN FORCES FACING IT WHEN IT CLAIMED THE EAST SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED BY THE COMPOSITION OF WESTERN FORCES FACING THE EAST? IN ORDER TO MEET THE INTERESTS OF BOTH SIDES AND TO PREVENT A DRASTIC CHANGE IN THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCES FACING EACH OTHER IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED CERTAIN CONDITIONS.

8. CZECHOSLOVAK REP PRESENTED EASTERN ANSWERS TO WESTERN QUESTIONS OF JUNE 20 ON DATA. THE ANSWERS WERE NOT FULLY RESPONSIVE AND INCLUDED FREQUENT CITATION OF EARLIER REPLIES. TARASOV CLAIMED THAT LIST B GIVEN THE EAST ON JUNE 20 HAD NOT BEEN COMPILED BY THE EAST AND WAS MOREOVER INAPPROPRIATE FOR USE IN DISCUSSION OF ALLOCATION. HE DECLINED TO STATE WHETHER LIST C ALSO GIVEN THE EAST ON JUNE 20 WAS CORRECT AS REGARDS ALLOCATION OF VARIOUS TYPES OF SOVIET UNITS TO THE CATEGORY OF MAJOR FORMATIONS

9. IN REPLY TO AN EARLIER WESTERN QUESTION ON THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS, CZECHOSLOVAK REP STATED THAT THE ADDITIONAL PHASE II US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND STAGE OF PHASE II. CZECHOSLOVAK REP THEN ASKED SEVERAL
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 02 OF 12 281844Z

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS ABOUT WESTERN DATA. THE QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON THE ALLOCATION OF FRG PERSHING AND NATO AIR DEFENSE PERSONNEL BETWEEN AIR AND GROUND FORCES IN WESTERN DATA. CANADIAN REP ASKED ABOUT THE TREATMENT OF UNIT LIMITATIONS IN THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS. TARASOV MADE CLEAR THAT THE SOVIETS EXPECTED TO ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ONLY ON THE TOTAL COMBINED NUMBER OF SOVIET TANK AND MECHANIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS REMAINING IN THE REDUCTION AREA AFTER SOVIET REDUCTIONS. HE DID NOT DENY IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF OTHER UNITS IN THE SOVIET FORCES. THERE WAS AN INDEFINITE EXCHANGE ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE UNIT LIMITATIONS PROPOSED BY THE EAST MIGHT BE A FURTHER BAR TO WESTERN MAINTENANCE OF THE COMMON CEILING.

9 BIS. THE TEXT OF THOSE PARAGRAPHS OF THE FULL REPORT OF THE JUNE 27 INFORMAL SESSION DEALING WITH THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS FOLLOWS BELOW. THE BALANCE OF THE FULL REPORT IS BEING FORWARDED BY AIRGRAM. END SUMMARY

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SECRET

PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 03 OF 12 281911Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15
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O P 281728Z JUN 78
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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

BEGIN TEXT

10. TARASOV AS HOST WELCOMED THE PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID THE PRESENT SESSION WAS A SPECIAL ONE SINCE PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE SAYING FAREWELL TO THE FRG REP AND TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK MILITARY ADVISOR. TARASOV REQUESTED POLISH REP TO MAKE FIRST STATEMENT FOR THE EAST.

11. POLISH REP SAID THE CONSENT OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS TO ESTABLISH COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS OPENED UP PRACTICAL WAYS TO ACHIEVE A MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON ONE OF THE KEY ISSUES, THE FINAL OUTCOME OF REDUCTION AND POST-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS. THIS WAS A MAJOR COMPROMISE STEP WHOSE GREAT MILITARY AND POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE WAS NO DOUBT WELL UNDERSTOOD BY WESTERN REPS. IN SAYING THIS, EASTERN REPS DID NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE EXISTING DIFFERENCES IN APPROACHES OF THE PARTICIPANTS TO THE METHODS OF ACHIEVING AND MAINTAINING THESE COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS. THE WESTERN COUNTRIES NOT ONLY DID NOT EXCLUDE, BUT
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 03 OF 12 281911Z

DIRECTLY PRE-SUPPOSED THAT, AFTER CARRYING OUT REDUCTIONS, SOME

STATES MIGHT RESTORE THE STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES TO THEIR NUMBERS PRIOR TO REDUCTIONS. WHAT WAS MORE, THE WESTERN ATTITUDE TOWARDS COLLECTIVITY OF POST-REDUCTION LEVELS ALLOWED PERFECTLY EVEN FOR A SITUATION IN WHICH THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ANY DIRECT PARTICIPANT OTHER THAN THE USSR AND THE USA MIGHT UNDER SOME CIRCUMSTANCES EXCEED THEIR PRESENT LEVEL. IF THIS TOOK PLACE, THE AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IN RESPECT TO THAT STATE WOULD TURN INTO A FICTION, AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT WOULD CEASE TO EXIST.

12. POLISH REP CONTINUED, ONE MIGHT ASK, WHAT WAS THE VALUE OF AN AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD ALLOW ANY STATE FACTUALLY TO AVOID REDUCTIONS? IT WAS PERFECTLY CLEAR THAT SUCH AN AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE NO VALUE WHATEVER.

13. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANY DEVIATION FROM THE GOAL OF THE REDUCTION AGREEMENT, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS FORESAW SOME CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE LEVELS OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES POSSESSED BEFORE THE REDUCTIONS BY EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATE COULD NOT BE RESTORED OR, EVEN LESS, EXCEEDED. IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF MAY 30, THE NETHERLANDS REP HAD DECLARED THAT, FOR THE EASTERN SIDE, IT SHOULD ALLEGEDLY BE IMPORTANT ONLY THAT THE WEST AS A WHOLE WOULD CUT ITS GROUND FORCES DOWN TO THE LEVEL OF 700,000 MEN AND THAT IT WOULD OBSERVE THIS LEVEL IN THE FUTURE, WHILE THE QUESTION OF HOW THESE REDUCTIONS WOULD BE DISTRIBUTED AMONG THE WESTERN COUNTRIES AND THE QUESTION OF BY WHAT MEANS THIS COLLECTIVE LEVEL WOULD BE MAINTAINED SHOULD SUPPOSEDLY BE OF NO INTEREST TO THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. OF COURSE, ONE COULD NOT AGREE WITH THIS SUPPOSITION. AN INCREASE OF FORCES BY SOME STATE UP TO AND ABOVE ITS LEVEL BEFORE REDUCTIONS, ESPECIALLY IF THAT STATE HAD, IN ANY EVENT, AT ITS DISPOSITION A POWERFUL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 03 OF 12 281911Z

MILITARY POTENTIAL, COULD NOT BUT GIVE RISE TO CONCERNS ON THE PART OF OTHER STATES WHICH WOULD REALLY AND TRULY EFFECTIVELY REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES. THESE STATES WOULD LOOK UPON SUCH DEVELOPMENTS AS A DIRECT THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY. CONSEQUENTLY, SUCH AN APPROACH TO THE COLLECTIVITY OF CEILINGS INVOLVED A POSSIBILITY OF DESTABILIZATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHICH WOULD DIRECTLY CONTRADICT THE AGREED OBJECTIVE OF THE VIENNA TALKS. LED BY THE DESIRE TO REMOVE THIS SHORTCOMING, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED TO INTRODUCE NECESSARY CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH THE COLLECTIVE FORCE LEVELS WOULD BE MAINTAINED.

14. POLISH REP SAID THE EAST'S NEW PROPOSALS CONTAINED YET ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONDITION CONCERNING THE MECHANISM FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES AFTER THEIR REDUCTION. AS ONE COULD EASILY VISUALIZE, IT WAS AIMED AT THE PREVENTION OF CONCEALED INCREASES IN THE

ARMED FORCE BY THE REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY PERSONNEL BY CIVILIANS. IN PRACTICE, IF THIS LIMITATION WERE NOT TO BE ENVISAGED, THE ACTUAL CEILING ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF 700,000 MILITARY PERSONNEL COULD BE EXCEEDED THROUGH THE EMPLOYMENT OF CIVILIANS IN MILITARY POSITIONS. AS A MATTER OF RECORD, THE EASTERN REPS HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT, IN THE FORCES OF THE FRG, CIVILIANS OCCUPYING MILITARY POSITIONS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE FORCE NUMBERS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, HOWEVER, WOULD LIKE TO HAVE CLEAR GUARANTEES THAT NONE OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES WOULD ATTEMPT EITHER NOW OR IN THE FUTURE COVERTLY TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ITS ARMED FORCES THROUGH THE EMPLOYMENT OF SOME ADDITIONAL CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN MILITARY POSITIONS. FOR THEIR PART, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE READY TO PROVIDE SUCH GUARANTEES.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 04 OF 12 281920Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

15. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, AT THIS POINT, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO RETURN TO A QUESTION RAISED BY THE US AND FRG REPS IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF JUNE 13 AND 20 RESPECTIVELY, WHEN THEY HAD EXPRESSED SOME MISGIVINGS THAT THE MECHANISM PROPOSED BY THE EAST FOR MAINTAINING THE COLLECTIVE LEVELS WOULD NOT ALLOW THE WEST TO PRESERVE THAT CEILING IN A SITUATION WHERE A MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRY, SAY THE FRG, WOULD UNILATERALLY CARRY OUT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF ITS FORCES.

16. POLISH REP SAID, FIRST, EASTERN REPS WISHED TO EMPHASIZE
ONCE AGAIN THAT THIS FORMULATION OF THE QUESTION WAS OF A
RATHER HYPOTHETICAL CHARACTER. AS FAR AS EASTERN REPS COULD
JUDGE, THE POSITION OF THE FRG IN THE FIELD OF DEFENSE TO DATE
HAD NOT REVEALED ANY INCLINATION TO CUT ITS MILITARY POTENTIAL
UNILATERALLY. THIS FULLY CONFORMED WITH THE NATO POLICY AS A
WHOLE. IT SUFFICED TO RECALL IN THIS CONNECTION THE RECENTLY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 04 OF 12 281920Z

APPROVED LONG TERM NATO PROGRAM ENVISAGING THE STRENGTHENING
OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ITS PARTICIPANTS BOTH IN
QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE TERMS OVER A PERIOD EXTENDING ALMOST
TO THE END OF THE PRESENT CENTURY. EASTERN REPS NATURALLY COULD
NOT BUILD AN AGREEMENT ON HYPOTHETICAL GROUNDS, ON A BASIS
OF FAR-FETCHED SITUATIONS WHICH SUPPOSEDLY COULD TAKE PLACE IN
SOME FUTURE TIME.

17. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT, SECONDLY, IF A SITUATION ACTUALLY
EMERGED UNDER WHICH THE NATO OR WARSAW TREATY STATES WOULD NOT
BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A COLLECTIVE CEILING ON THE NUMERICAL
STRENGTH OF THEIR FORCES AT THE ENVISAGED LEVEL, THEN COMPLETELY
NEW CIRCUMSTANCES WOULD HAVE EVOLVED AND THESE COULD BE ADDITIONALLY
CONSIDERED BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGREEMENT IN ACCORDANCE
WITH THE PROVISIONS RELATED TO ITS IMPLEMENTATION, AND WITH A
VIEW OF MAINTAINING THE AGREED COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS.

18. POLISH REP SAID EASTERN REPS THEREFORE WISHED ONCE AGAIN
TO POINT OUT THAT EVEN SUCH HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS COULD HARDLY
DETRACT FROM THE EASTERN CONVICTION THAT THE CONDITIONS WHICH
THE EAST HAD PROPOSED WERE ABSOLUTELY WELL-FOUNDED. WHILE PREVENTING
ANY DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP OF ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL
EUROPE, THEY ALLOWED AT THE SAME TIME FOR MAKING SUCH CORRECTIONS
IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES AS MIGHT APPEAR
NECESSARY FOR MAINTAINING THE COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVEL.

19. POLISH REP CONTINUED THAT EASTERN REPS HAD ALREADY
CRITICIZED THE WEST FOR ITS ATTEMPTS TO TIE THE POST-REDUCTION
COLLECTIVE CEILINGS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT UNDER THESE CEILINGS
OF SEPARATE NATIONAL LIMITS FOR THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION
AND THE US, IN OTHER WORDS, THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NATIONAL
SUBCEILINGS. IN MEETING THE WEST ON THE QUESTION OF COLLECTIVE
LEVELS, THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS FIRMLY REFUSED TO ACCEPT THE
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 04 OF 12 281920Z

IDEA OF SUCH NATIONAL SUBCEILINGS IN THEIR NEW PROPOSALS BECAUSE

THIS NOTION CONTRADICTED THE EASTERN POSITION OF PRINCIPLE AND
WAS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED
SECURITY FOR EACH PARTY.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 05 OF 12 281933Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
L-03 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

20. POLISH REP CONTINUED, IN THIS CONNECTION, EASTERN REPS
HAD INDICATED THAT THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL LIMITS FOR THE USSR
AND THE US FORCES DID NOT CONFORM TO THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENT
OBLIGATIONS AND AN EQUITABLE FINAL OUTCOME OF REDUCTIONS, BECAUSE
IT WOULD RESULT IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COLLECTIVE CEILING
FOR SOME STATES AND INDIVIDUAL CEILINGS FOR OTHER STATES.
MOREOVER, THIS CONCEPT WAS DISCREIMINATORY WITH REGARD TO THE
FORCES OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS BECAUSE THE LIMITS WOULD HAVE
TO COVER SOVIET FORCES, WHICH AMOUNTED TO SOME 50 PERCENT OF
FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE, WHEREAS
THE FORCES OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA, TOTALLING
SOME 75 PERCENT OF THE NATO FORCES, WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO
SIMILAR LIMITATIONS.

21. POLISH REP SAID THAT, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF ONE CAREFULLY
EXAMINED THE PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, ONE COULD NOT
FAIL TO SEE THAT THESE PROPOSALS ENVISAGED IDENTICAL LIMITATIONS
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 05 OF 12 281933Z

ON MANPOWER INCREASES AFTER REDUCTIONS FOR ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES, BOTH EAST AND WEST INCLUDING THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION. CONSEQUENTLY, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE FULLY JUSTIFIED IN SAYING THAT THEIR PROPOSAL TO COVER BY COLLECTIVE CEILINGS THE FORCES OF ALL PARTICIPANTS WITHOUT ANY EXCEPTION WAS THE ONLY JUST, LOGICAL, AND CONSISTENT ONE. WITHOUT THIS SOLUTION, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE ABLE AT ALL TO ACCEPT THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS WHICH, AS EASTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD IT, HAD A PARAMOUNT IMPORTANCE TO THE WEST.

22. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO COMMENT IN THE PRESENT SESSION ON PRECISELY THE SAME SUBJECT AS HAD BEEN RAISED BY THE POLISH REP, NAMELY, THE WAY IN WHICH THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSALS ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF MANPOWER LIMITATIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD STATED THAT THE EAST HAD ACCEPTED THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS FOR THE MILITARY MANPOWER OF THE TWO SIDES. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WELCOMED EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE MANPOWER CEILINGS APPLIED TO THE OVERALL GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER OF BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE COLLECTIVE IN NATURE. THIS WAS A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT FORWARD STEP IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ALSO WELCOMED THE EAST'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT PARTICIPANTS MUST BE IN A POSITION TO MAINTAIN THE OVERALL POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVEL ON EACH SIDE. THIS, TOO, WAS A POTENTIALLY IMPORTANT FORWARD STEP.

23. FRG REP STATED THAT, HOWEVER, EASTERN EXPLANATIONS OF THEIR JUNE 8 PROPOSALS INDICATED THAT, ALTHOUGH THIS ACCEPTANCE IN PRINCIPLE WAS IMPORTANT, THE PARTICULAR METHOD WHICH THE EAST HAD CHOSEN TO CARRY OUT THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY APPEARED TO CREATE MANY SERIOUS PROBLEMS. EASTERN STATEMENTS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSALS COULD PREVENT MAINTENANCE OF THE OVERALL POST-REDUCTION MANPOWER LEVEL OF WESTERN

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 05 OF 12 281933Z

PARTICIPANTS. MORE SPECIFICALLY, UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OF

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 06 OF 12 282133Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03
OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-05 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00
NRC-05 /083 W

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O P 281728Z JUN 78
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SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNRM SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 6 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

JUNE 8, UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS COULD NOT BE COMPENSATED FOR BY
A SINGLE OTHER COUNTRY. THIS WAS BECAUSE OF THE EASTERN RULE
THAT NO COUNTRY COULD COMPENSATE FOR MORE THAN 50 PERCENT OF THE
TOTAL UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS ON ITS SIDE. THUS, IF A WESTERN
COUNTRY REDUCED ITS FORCES UNILATERALLY BY 5000,
AND IF ONLY ONE WESTERN COUNTRY WAS IN A POSITION AT THAT TIME
TO INCREASE ITS FORCES, THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT BE
PERMITTED UNDER THIS EASTERN PROPOSAL TO MAINTAIN THE AGREED,
POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVEL. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE ALSO COULD
BE CASES WHERE TWO OR MORE WESTERN COUNTRIES WOULD BE PREPARED
TO COMPENSATE FOR A UNILATERAL REDUCTION ON THEIR SIDE, BUT
WOULD BE PREVENTED FROM DOING SO BY THE EASTERN RULE THAT NO
COUNTRY COULD EXCEED ITS PRE-REDUCTION FORCE LEVEL.

24. FRG REP SAID THAT FURTHERMORE, AS WESTERN REPS HAD POINTED
OUT AT THE JUNE 13 AND JUNE 20 INFORMAL SESSIONS, AND AS EASTERN
REPS HAD ACKNOWLEDGED, A SITUATION COULD ARISE UNDER THIS EASTERN
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 06 OF 12 282133Z

PROPOSAL WHERE, NO MATTER HOW MANY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE
PREPARED TO COMPENSATE FOR UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS, IT WOULD BE
MATHEMATICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR THEM TO DO SO WITHOUT VIOLATING
ONE OF THE TWO EASTERN RULES. IT WAS NOT THE CASE THAT THIS
POSSIBILITY WAS EXTREME OR FAR-FETCHED. FOR EXAMPLE, USING THE
EASTERN APPROACH OF REDUCTIONS BY THE SAME PERCENTAGE FOR EACH
PARTICIPANT ON A GIVEN SIDE, IF THE US REDUCED BY A TOTAL
OF 50,000, AFTER AN AGREEMENT HAD BEEN IMPLEMENTED, IT WOULD
NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO MAKE UP

THE REDUCTIONS. THE FRG WOULD BE LIMITED TO AN INCREASE OF 25,000 BY THE 50 PERCENT RULE AND THE OTHER NON-REDUCING PARTICIPANTS, THE UK, BENELUX COUNTRIES AND CANADA, WOULD BE LIMITED TO A TOTAL INCREASE OF LESS THAN 25,000 BECAUSE, SHOULD THEY INCREASE BY THIS AMOUNT, THEY WOULD EXCEED THEIR PRE-REDUCTION CEILING. THUS, WITH ANY REDUCTIONS OF 50,000 OR MORE BY THE US, EVEN IF OTHER PARTICIPANTS WERE ALL IN A POSITION TO TAKE THEIR MAXIMUM POSSIBLE INCREASES, THE WEST WOULD BE BELOW ITS 700,000 CEILING.

25. FRG REP STATED THAT IN EACH OF THE CASES HE HAD JUST DESCRIBED, THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSALS WOULD IMPAIR THE ABILITY OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO MAINTAIN THE AGREED POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS BY WESTERN PARTICIPANTS. AT THE SAME TIME, AS WESTERN PARTICIPANTS POINTED OUT IN THE JUNE 20 INFORMAL SESSION, AND AS EASTERN PARTICIPANTS APPEARED TO ACKNOWLEDGE, THE JUNE 8 EASTERN PROPOSAL WOULD PERMIT THE SOVIET UNION TO RETURN ALMOST IMMEDIATELY TO ITS STARTING LEVEL IN MILITARY MANPOWER AND THEREBY TO NEGATE THE EFFECT OF ITS REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS SAID THIS SITUATION WOULD BE AN EXTREME CASE, A THEORETICAL ONE. BUT THEY ADMITTED THERE WOULD BE NOTHING IN THE EASTERN PROPOSALS TO PREVENT THIS SITUATION. WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WOULD HAVE NO BASIS IN THE AGREEMENT TO CHALLENGE IT IF IT OCCURRED.

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 06 OF 12 282133Z

26. FRG REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN JUNE 8 PROPOSAL COULD THUS RESULT IN A SITUATION WHERE THE WEST WAS UNABLE TO MAINTAIN ITS PERMITTED MAXIMUM LEVEL, BUT WHERE SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA WOULD HAVE RETURNED TO THEIR PRE-REDUCTION STRENGTH, WHILE THE LARGE SOVIET FORCES IN THE ADJACENT SOVIET UNION, FORCES WHICH WOULD NOT BE UNDER ANY LIMITATION AS TO SIZE, MIGHT HAVE INCREASED STILL FURTHER. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD SERIOUSLY DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 07 OF 12 282009Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY

USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 7 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

27. FRG REP STATED THAT AT THE JUNE 20 INFORMAL SESSION, AMB TARASOV HAD SAID THAT IF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS BELIEVED THAT DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE CORRELATION OF FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES IN THE AREA COULD TAKE PLACE UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, THEN THEY COULD SUBMIT PROPOSALS OF THEIR OWN TO FIND A WAY OUT OF SUCH A SITUATION. HOWEVER, WESTERN REPS DID NOT FEEL THAT IT WAS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO RECTIFY THE DESTABILIZING DEFECTS OF THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD ALREADY MADE PROPOSALS ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS UNDER WHICH SITUATIONS OF THE SORT DESCRIBED WOULD NOT ARISE. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS ON MANPOWER LIMITATIONS WOULD AFFORD EACH SIDE THE PRACTICAL OPPORTUNITY TO MAINTAIN ITS AGREED, POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS. AT THE SAME TIME, THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD SPECIFICALLY LIMIT AT THE POST-REDUCTION LEVEL THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN THE REDUCTION AREA OF THE USSR AND THE US BECAUSE OF THE UNIQUE MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POTENTIAL OF THESE TWO COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 07 OF 12 282009Z

PREVENT AN UNACCEPTABLE SITUATION IN WHICH THE USSR COULD, AFTER REDUCTIONS, INCREASE ITS FORCES NOT ONLY ON ITS ADJACENT TERRITORY BUT IN THE REDUCTION AREA AS WELL. WESTERN REPS WELCOMED THE EASTERN MOVES OF PRINCIPLE ON THE TOPIC OF MANPOWER CEILINGS, BUT THEY THOUGHT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS REMAINED A MORE EFFECTIVE WAY OF DEALING WITH THIS ISSUE.

28. US DEP REP SAID IN CONNECTION WITH FRG REP'S PRESENTATION, HE WANTED TO MAKE A BRIEF PERSONAL COMMENT ON THE REMARKS JUST MADE BY POLISH REP. POLISH REP HAD SUGGESTED THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO RELIEVE A SITUATION WHERE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO MAINTAIN THEIR COLLECTIVE CEILING LEVEL AT THE PERMITTED MAXIMUM. HE SAW TWO PROBLEMS IN THIS CONCEPT. FIRST, A POTENTIAL SOLUTION WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON THE DISCRETION OF THE EAST. SECOND, THE IMPLICATION THAT THE EAST MIGHT AGREE TO

COME DOWN TO THE NEW WESTERN LEVEL DID NOT DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM TO WHICH FRG REP HAD REFERRRED, THAT THE STANDING ACTIVE DUTY SOVIET FORCES IN THE ADJOINING SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN SIZE AND MIGHT INCREASE. THUS, THE TOTAL EASTERN FORCE WHICH MIGHT BE BROUGHTS TO BEAR IN THE REDUCTION AREA IN THE FIRST DAYS OF AN EMERGENCY MIGHT INCREASE WHILE THE TOTAL OF PERMITTED WESTERN FORCES WOULD HAVE DECREASED. THESE CIRCUMSTANCES EXPLAINED IN PART WHY THE WEST MUST BE PERMITTED TO MAINTAIN ITS FORCES AT THEIR FULL AGREED LEVEL AFTER REDUCTIONS.

29. FRG REP SAID HE, TOO, WOULD LIKE TO ADD A PERSONAL REMARK. OF COURSE, IT MIGHT BE THAT IN THE DISTANT FUTURE NATO COULD BE FACED BY SERIOUS DIFFICULTIES. THIS WAS NOT LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE NEAR FUTURE, TO THE SATISFACTION OF FRG REP. BUT IF THESE DIFFICULTIES SHOULD OCCUR, THE NATO MEMBER COUNTRIES MUST BE ALLOED TO SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS AMONG THEMSELVES. IT WOULD BE VERY UNREAL TO SUGGEST A SOLUTION BY WHICH THE NATO COUNTRIES WOULD BE DEPENDENT ON THE COOPERATION AND GOOD WILL OF THE WARSAW
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 07 OF 12 282009Z

TREATY COUNTRIES TO SOLVE THEIR OWN PROBLEMS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 08 OF 12 282048Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00
NSCE-00 SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
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USCINCEUR PRIORITY

SECRET SECTION 8 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

30. FRG REP SAID POLISH REP HAD JUST SAID THAT THE EXAMPLE WHICH FRG REP HAD GIVEN IN THE LAST SESSION OF A POSSIBLE UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF THE BUNDESWEHR WAS A VERY HYPOTHETICAL CASE AND THAT THE FRG HAD NOT REVEALED ANY INTENTION TO CUT ITS FORCES UNILATERALLY. THIS WAS, OF COURSE, CORRECT. BUT, IN JUSTIFICATION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS, THE POLISH REP HAD SPOKEN ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT ONE COUNTRY, PROBABLY REFERRING TO THE FRG, COULD WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE CEILINGS OF 700,000 INCREASE ITS OWN FORCES TO SUCH AN EXTENT THAT THE OTHER STATES WOULD HAVE TO LOOK ON THIS AS A DIRECT THREAT TO THEIR SECURITY. THIS SEEMED TO FRG REP TO BE A MUCH MORE HYPOTHETICAL CASE. BESIDES, EVEN IF ONE COUNTRY IN NATO SHOULD ON A VERY HYPOTHETICAL BASIS INCREASE ITS FORCES WITHIN THE 700,000 LIMIT, HE FAILED TO SEE HOW THIS COULD BE A THREAT TO EASTERN SECURITY, GIVEN THE FACT THAT THERE WAS AN OVERALL CEILING OF 700,000 MEN AND GIVEN THE FACT OF THE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION AND THE FACT THAT SOVIET FORCES IN THE IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT AREA WOULD
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 08 OF 12 282048Z

NOT BE LIMITED. HOWEVER, AS FRG REP HAD ALREADY SAID, THIS WAS A MUCH MORE HYPOTHETICAL CASE THAN THE ONE WHICH FRG REP HAD GIVEN IN THE LAST SESSION.

31. TARASOV SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE SOME REMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH THE STATEMENT JUST MADE BY THE FRG REP. IN HIS STATEMENT, THE FRG REP HAD REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO THE FACT THAT THE SOVIET UNION POSSESSED FORCES OUTSIDE THE REDUCTION AREA AND TRIED TO LINK THIS FACT TO THE MECHANISM OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS OR COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. IN THIS CONNECTION, TARASOV WISHED TO NOTE THAT THE WESTERN SCHEME FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE HAD ALSO BEEN CONSTRUCTED TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE EXISTENCE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION. THEREFORE, BOTH THE WESTERN PROPOSALS AND EASTERN PROPOSALS COULD NOT IN THIS REGARD CHANGE THE FACT OF THE EXISTING GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF THE SOVIET UNION TO THE REDUCTION AREA.

32. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, SINCE BOTH SIDES, IN VIEW OF THE NEW PROPOSALS OF THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS, WERE COMING TO AN UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH SOME COLLECTIVE LEVELS, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ALL THEIR ATTENTION ON THE MECHANISM OF FUNCTIONING OF THE COMMON COLLECTIVE LEVELS AND, AS TARASOV UNDERSTOOD IT, THE FRG REP'S STATEMENT HAD BEEN DEVOTED PARTICULARLY TO THIS ISSUE. ONE OF THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE FRG REP IN CONNECTION WITH THE EASTERN SCHEME IN FUNCTIONING OF COLLECTIVE LEVELS WAS THAT, IF THERE SHOULD BE UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF FORCES BY SOME WARSAW

TREATY COUNTRIES, THE SOVIET UNION WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO INCREASE THE STRENGTH OF ITS FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. THE HIGHEST SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAD REPEATEDLY STATED THAT THE SOVIET UNION DID NOT INTEND TO INCREASE ITS FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA. AS FAR AS HE KNEW, THERE WERE NO PLANS FOR THE INCREASE

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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 08 OF 12 282048Z

OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE OTHER WARSAW TREATY DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE TALKS.

33. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, OBJECTIVELY, THIS FACT COULD BE PROVEN BY AT LEAST TWO PROPOSALS PRESENTED BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. ONE OF THESE PROPOSALS WAS THE EASTERN PROPOSAL TO FREEZE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL THE STATES IN THE REDUCTION AREA DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECOND ONE WAS THAT, FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN PREPARED TO ESTABLISH NATIONAL CEILINGS FOR THE FORCES OF ALL STATES AFTER REDUCTIONS. NEITHER OF THESE PROPOSALS HAD BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE WEST. CONSEQUENTLY, THE WEST WAS CONCERNED, NOT BY THE POSSIBILITY OF THE INCREASE OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, BUT, RATHER THE BASIS OF WESTERN OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE EASTERN SCHEME WAS TO KEEP A FREE HAND FOR THE WEST FOR POURING THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF ARMED FORCES OF ONE COUNTRY INTO THE FORCES OF ANOTHER.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 09 OF 12 282142Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 9 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

34. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, OBJECTIVELY, THIS WESTERN INTENTION COULD BE PROVEN BY THE FACT THAT, AMONG OTHER ARGUMENTS SET FORTH TO SUBSTANTIATE THE WESTERN CONCEPT OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, WESTERN REPS IN PARTICULAR HAD MADE THE FOLLOWING ARGUMENT WHICH TARASOV WAS CITING BY MEMORY IF DESIRED, HE COULD PROBABLY FIND THE CITATION: FOR THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE EAST, IT SHOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT, ON THE WESTERN SIDE, THEY WOULD BE CONFRONTED BY 900,000 ARMED MEN OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES INCLUDING 700,000 GROUND FORCES, AND THAT, IN THIS CONNECTION, FOR THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE EASTERN COUNTRY, IT SHOULD NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE THE FORCES OF WHICH NATO COUNTRIES WOULD BE CONFRONTING THEM IN THE REDUCTION AREA. IN THIS CASE, TARASOV COULD EASILY ANSWER THE ARGUMENT OF FRG REP. THAT IS, FOR THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERSHIP OF THE WEST, IT SHOULD BE IMPORTANT THAT, ON THE EASTERN SIDE THEY WOULD BE CONFRONTED BY 900,000 MEN INCLUDING 700,000 MEN IN THE GROUND FORCES AND THAT, FOR THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 09 OF 12 282142Z

THE WEST, IT SHOULD MAKE NO DIFFERENCE WHICH PARTICIPANT FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY COUNTRIES WOULD BE CONFRONTING THEM IN THE AREA. IF THE WEST DID BELIEVE THAT IT WOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE WHICH FORCES OF WHICH PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES WOULD BE CONFRONTING NATO COUNTRIES IN THE REDUCTION AREA, THEN IT SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT, FOR THE EAST, IT WOULD ALSO MAKE A DIFFERENCE WHICH FORCES OF THE NATO COUNTRIES ARE CONFRONTING IT IN THE REDUCTION AREA.

35. TARASOV CONTINUED THAT, IN ORDER TO ELIMINATE CONCERNS ON BOTH SIDES AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE COMPOSITION OF EACH OF THE TWO CONFRONTING GROUPINGS, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD PROPOSED CERTAIN CONDITIONS FOR MAINTAINING COLLECTIVE LEVELS WHICH, AS HAD BEEN NOTED BY POLISH REP, WHILE PERMITTING CERTAIN NECESSARY CORRECTIONS OR CHANGES IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF INDIVIDUAL STATES OF ONE GROUPING OR THE OTHER WOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, PREVENT THE POSSIBILITY OF DRASTIC CHANGES IN THE EXISTING CORRELATION OF FORCES IN THE AREA. THE MECHANISM FOR MAINTAINING COLLECTIVE LEVELS PROPOSED BY THE EAST PROVIDED FOR EQUAL CONDITIONS FOR BOTH SIDES AND THEREFORE THE WEST DID NOT HAVE SERIOUS GROUNDS TO OBJECT TO THIS.

36. TARASOV SAID NATURALLY HE HAD TOUCHED UPON ONLY SOME

ASPECTS OF FRG REP'S STATEMENT; EASTERN REPS WOULD ANALYZE THE STATEMENT FURTHER AND IN DUE COURSE WOULD PROVIDE A FURTHER RESPONSE.

37. US DEP REP SAID HE WANTED TO MAKE A BRIEF COMMENT ON THESE REMARKS. TARASOV HAD JUST MADE SOME COMMENTS ABOUT THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTICIPATION ON EACH SIDE UNDER A COLLECTIVE CEILING. TO THESE, US DEP REP MERELY WISHED TO SAY THAT, ON THE NATO SIDE, THERE WAS NO PARTICIPANT WHICH HAD VERY LARGE FORCES
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PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 09 OF 12 282142Z

ON ITS HOME TERRITORY AND WHOSE HOME TERRITORY DIRECTLY ADJOINED THE REDUCTION AREA. IT WAS TRUE THAT PARTICIPANTS COULD NOT CHANGE THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY. BUT THESE FACTS MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN AN AGREEMENT. THE EASTERN PROPOSALS ON THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON CEILING DID NOT DO SO. THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WHICH DID PERMIT THE WEST TO MAINTAIN THE FORCES PERMITTED IT AFTER REDUCTIONS AT THEIR FULL LEVEL WERE IN PART BASED ON THE GEOGRAPHIC FACT THAT THE SOVIET HOME TERRITORY ADJOINED THE REDUCTION AREA AND THAT THE ALREADY LARGE FORCES ON IT WOULD NOT BE LIMITED IN SIZE AND MIGHT INCREASE.

38. AT THE REQUEST OF TARASOV, WHO SAID HIS INTERVENTION HAD BEEN AN IMPROMPTU ONE, THE WESTERN REPS AGREED THAT CZECHOSLOVAK REP SHOULD CONTINUE WITH PREPARED PRESENTATION.

58. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID EASTERN REPS WOULD NOW LIKE TO ANSWER WESTERN QUESTIONS ABOUT THE EAST'S JUNE 8 PROPOSALS.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 10 OF 12 282147Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 10 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

59. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THE WEST HAD ASKED WHEN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE US WOULD CARRY OUT THEIR ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS IN STAGE 2, IN THE COURSE OF THE FIRST, THE SECOND OR THE THIRD YEAR.

60. WESTERN REPS INTERJECTED THAT AN EFFORT BE MADE TO NORM THE VOCABULARY OF EAST AND WEST AS REGARDS PHASES AND STAGES. TARASOV AGREED THIS WOULD BE DESIRABLE.

61. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT THE ANSWER WAS AS FOLLOWS: THE PRECISE TIMING OF SOVIET AND US FORCE REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE WOULD BE DETERMINED TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE AGREEMENT ON THE SUCCESSION OF THE FORCE REDUCTIONS BY THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE SECOND STAGE. EASTERN REPS WERE NONETHELESS PREPARED TO AGREE WITH THAT PART OF THE WESTERN PROPOSALS OF APRIL 19, 1978, IN WHICH IT WAS ENVISAGED THAT THE ADDITIONAL SOVIET AND US FORCE REDUCTIONS WOULD TAKE PLACE IN THE SECOND STAGE OF PHASE II.

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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 10 OF 12 282147Z

67. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, ACTING CANADIAN REP SAID THAT HE NOW WISHED TO ASK SOME FURTHER QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EASTERN PROPOSALS OF JUNE 8. HIS FIRST QUESTION WAS: GDR REP, AT THE JUNE 20 INFORMAL SESSION HAD SAID THAT LIMITATIONS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE NUMBER OF THE LARGEST MAIN FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS OF EACH STATE BY WHICH THIS STAGE WAS GOING TO REDUCE ITS FORCES. SOVIET REP HAD STATED IN THE SAME SESSION THAT THE EASTERN PROPOSALS DID NOT SPECIFY WHAT TYPES OF DIVISIONS THE SOVIET UNION PROPOSED TO WITHDRAW. THE WESTERN QUESTION WAS, IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THE SOVIET UNION WITHDREW ONE TANK DIVISION AND ONE MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION, WOULD THERE BE A SEPARATE LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET TANK DIVISIONS AND ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS. OR WOULD THERE BE A GENERAL LIMITATION ON ALL SOVIET DIVISIONS IN THE AREA?

68. TARASOV REPLIED, IN THIS EXAMPLE CITED BY THE CANADIAN REP, TANK DIVISIONS AND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS WERE REFERRED

TO. BOTH TYPES OF THESE DIVISIONS WERE ALLOCATED BY THE SOVIET UNION TO MAIN FORCES. THEREFORE, POST-REDUCTION LIMITATIONS WOULD COVER BOTH OF THESE TYPES OF DIVISIONS. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER A TANK DIVISION OR A MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISION HAD BEEN REDUCED, BOTH WOULD BE COVERED.

69. TO FRG REP'S FOLLOW-UP QUESTION, TARASOV EXPLAINED THAT IN THIS CASE, THE EAST HAD IN MIND A SINGLE NUMERICAL TOTAL LIMIT FOR ALL TANK AND MOTORIZED RIFLE DIVISIONS. A LIMIT WOULD COVER THE TOTAL NUMBER OF BOTH TYPES OF SOVIET DIVISIONS EVEN IF ONLY TANK DIVISIONS WERE REDUCED.

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 11 OF 12 282153Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 11 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

70. CANADIAN REP SAID HIS SECOND QUESTION WAS: AMBASSADOR OESER AT THE JUNE 20 INFORMAL SESSION HAD SAID THAT IT WOULD NOT BE FORBIDDEN TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF SMALLER MILITARY SUB-UNITS. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, THERE WAS A LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET DIVISIONS, BUT NO LIMITATION ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS, COULD THE SOVIET UNION INCREASE THE NUMBER OF REGIMENTS IN ITS DIVISIONS, OR THE NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT BRIGADES OR REGIMENTS SEPARATE FROM DIVISIONS? WESTERN REPS ASSUMED TAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET ARMIES IN THE AREA COULD ALSO BE INCREASED. IF THESE POSSIBILITIES REMAINED OPEN, WHAT WOULD BE THE VALUE OF LIMITATIONS ON THE NUMBER OF SOVIET

DIVISIONS?

71. TARASOV SAID, THEORETICALLY, THE NUMBER OF REGIMENTS IN DIVISIONS COULD BE INCREASED, AND THE NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT REGIMENTS SEPARATE FROM DIVISIONS COULD ALSO BE INCREASED AS WELL. AS FAR AS ARMIES WAS CONCERNED, THEIR NUMBER COULD NOT
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SECRET

PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 11 OF 12 282153Z

BE INCREASED BECAUSE ARMIES CONSISTED OF DIVISIONS AND THE NUMBER OF DIVISIONS WOULD BE LIMITED UNDER THE EASTERN PROPOSALS.

72. FRG REP POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIET UNION COULD HAVE MORE ARMIES, SOME COMPOSED OF ONLY TWO DIVISIONS, FOR EXAMPLE.

73. TARASOV SAID, FOR THE SOVIET UNION, THIS QUESTION HAD ONLY ONE SINGLE SOLUTION SINCE A CERTAIN TYPE OF ARMY HAD BEEN SHAPED IN THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES. FROM A MILITARY VIEW, IT WOULD BE INEXPEDIENT OR INEFFICIENT TO HAVE AN ARMY CONSISTING ONLY OF TWO DIVISIONS.

74.. CANADIAN REP SAID HIS THIRD QUESTION WAS:
AMB OESER, AT THE JUNE 20 INFORMAL SESSION, HAD STATED THAT UNIT LIMITATIONS WOULD BE APPLIED TO THE NUMBER OF THE LARGEST MAIN FORMATIONS, UNITS AND SUB-UNITS OF EACH STATE BY WHICH THIS STATE WAS GOING TO REDUCE ITS FORCES. HOW WAS THIS PROVISION CONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY, WHICH EASTERN PARTICIPANTS CLAIMED TO HAVE ACCEPTED? WOULD THIS PROVISION NOT FURTHER INHIBIT THE ABILITY OF DIRECT PARTICIPANTS ON A GIVEN SIDE TO COMPENSATE FOR UNILATERAL FORCE REDUCTIONS ON THAT SIDE?

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PAGE 01 MBFR V 00383 12 OF 12 282205Z
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 CIAE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SSO-00 ICAE-00 INRE-00 H-01 INR-10 IO-13 L-03
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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 12 OF 12 MBFR VIENNA 0383

75. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS DID NOT SEE HOW THE REALIZATION OF THE EASTERN PROPOSALS CONCERNING THE LIMITATION OF THE OVERALL NUMBER OF FORMATIONS AND UNITS SUBJECT TO REDUCTION COULD CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE FUNCTIONING OF THE COLLECTIVE LEVEL AND FOR THE PARTIAL REDISTRIBUTION OF FORCES IN CASE OF A UNILATERAL REDUCTION MADE BY ONE OF THE PARTICIPANTS OF A GIVEN GROUPING. IN THIS CASE, EASTERN REPS WERE PROCEEDING FROM THE FACT THAT THE 50 PERCENT RULE PROPOSED BY THE EAST WOULD MEAN THAT, IF ONE OF THE COUNTRIES REDUCED ITS FORCES BY ONE REGIMENT, NO OTHER COUNTRY WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS ARMED FORCES BY A REGIMENT. APPLYING THE 50 PERCENT RULE, IT WOULD BE ABLE TO INCREASE ITS ARMED FORCES ONLY BY A RESPECTIVE NUMBER OF BATTALIONS.

76. FRG REP SAID THAT THIS WOULD BE AN ANSWER ONLY IF THE EAST TOOK AS A RULE THAT EACH DIRECT PARTICIPANT REDUCE ONLY ONE UNIT OF A KIND, SAY ONE REGIMENT. BUT, IF FOR EXAMPLE, IT REDUCED
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PAGE 02 MBFR V 00383 12 OF 12 282205Z

THREE REGIMENTS, THEN IT COULD NOT INCREASE ITS FORCES UNDER THE 50 PERCENT RULE BECAUSE OF THIS UNIT LIMITATION BECAUSE ONE COULD NOT RAISE FORCES BY ONE AND A HALF REGIMENTS OR ONE AND A HALF BATTALIONS.

77. TARASOV SAID EASTERN REPS WOULD CONSIDER THIS QUESTION FURTHER AND WOULD REPLY LATER.

78. CANADIAN REP ASKED WHETHER THE 50 PERCENT RULE ALSO APPLIED TO THE NUMBER OF UNITS WHICH OTHER PARTICIPANTS ON ONE SIDE COULD INCREASE BY IN ORDER TO MAKE UP UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS.

79. TARASOV SAID THE EAST HAD IN MIND APPLYING BOTH PRINCIPLES, THE 50 PERCENT RULE AND NOT EXCEEDING THE NUMBER OF THE LARGEST UNITS BY WHICH A GIVEN STATE WAS REDUCING ITS ARMED FORCES. AS FOR THE ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF HOW THESE TWO PRINCIPLES COULD APPLY SIMULTANEOUSLY, EASTERN REPS WOULD GIVE AN ANSWER LATER.

80. FRG REP SAID, THEN, UNDER THE 50 PERCENT RULE, IF ONE COUNTRY REDUCED TWO BRIGADES OR TWO BATTALIONS, A SECOND COUNTRY COULD NOT MAKE UP FOR THESE REDUCTIONS UNDER THE UNIT LIMITATIONS RULE.

81. US DEP REP ASKED WHETHER IT WAS A CORRECT UNDERSTANDING THAT, IF ONE WESTERN PARTICIPANT LIMITED A CERTAIN TYPE OF UNITS, THEN ALL THE UNITS OF THAT TYPE IN THE FORCES OF ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE LIMITED. TARASOV SAID THIS WOULD NOT BE THE CASE.

82. CANADIAN REP REMINED TARASOV THAT THE EAST HAD NOT YET ANSWERED THE QUESTION OF THE OPERATION OF THE COMMON CEILING FOR AIR FORCE MANPOWER ASKED BY THE US REP IN THE JUNE 20 SESSION.
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SECRET

PAGE 03 MBFR V 00383 12 OF 12 282205Z

TARASOV SAID THE EAST HAD NOT FORGOTTEN THIS AND WOULD GIVEN AN ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION LATER.

END TEXT. DEAN

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